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Abstract
Bluetooth chips must include a Random Number Gener-
ator (RNG). This RNG is used internally within crypto-
graphic primitives but also exposed to the operating system
for chip-external applications. In general, it is a black box
with security-critical authentication and encryption mecha-
nisms depending on it. In this paper, we evaluate the quality
of RNGs in various Broadcom and Cypress Bluetooth chips.
We find that the RNG implementation significantly changed
over the last decade. Moreover, most devices implement an in-
secure Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) fallback.
Multiple popular devices, such as the Samsung Galaxy S8 and
its variants as well as an iPhone, rely on the weak fallback due
to missing a Hardware Random Number Generator (HRNG).
We statistically evaluate the output of various HRNGs in chips
used by hundreds of millions of devices. While the Broadcom
and Cypress HRNGs pass advanced tests, it remains indistin-
guishable for users if a Bluetooth chip implements a secure
RNG without an extensive analysis as in this paper. We de-
scribe our measurement methods and publish our tools to
enable further public testing.
1 Introduction
High-quality random numbers ensure security within cryp-
tographic methods. The Bluetooth 5.2 specification makes
no exception to this—it requires a Bluetooth chip to pro-
vide at least a PRNG compliant to FIPS PUB 140-2 [7, 14,
p. 953]. Various security-relevant functions depend on random
numbers, such as generating authentication and encryption
keys, nonces within Secure Simple Pairing (SSP), or passkeys
used in authentication. Moreover, embedded and Internet of
Things (IoT) devices with Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) can
request random numbers locally from the chip [7, p. 2521].
Thus, a Bluetooth chip’s RNG quality can also be relevant to
external applications.
According to the specification, the RNG shall be tested
against FIPS SP800-22 [4]. Recommended test suites are
Diehard, Dieharder, and the NIST tools [8, 15]. We choose
the Dieharder suite, as it implements the most extensive tests.
Verification of the randomness properties is not straightfor-
ward. Even though these test suites exist, the local Host Con-
troller Interface (HCI) that enables the operating system to
request random numbers from the chip introduces a lot of
overhead per request and only returns an 8 B number. In con-
trast, the Dieharder test suite requires at least 1 GB of unique
data to return meaningful results, making randomness tests a
challenge.
Statistical tests might not uncover all issues within an RNG.
The underlying implementation can be a HRNG or PRNG.
The latter is part of the chip’s firmware and could have flaws
only detectable by reverse-engineering the implementation.
While the HRNG could also have flaws that stay undetected
by statistical tests, this goes beyond the analysis of this paper.
The according datasheets, which are only available for a few
of the older chips, do not cover any details about the HRNG.
In this paper, we reverse-engineer and measure the RNG
implementations of Broadcom and Cypress Bluetooth chips1.
In particular, we analyze the RNGs on 20 chips, including
those on the most recent iPhones and Samsung Galaxy S
series. To this end, we root or jailbreak those devices, dump
their firmware with the InternalBlue framework [13], and
reverse-engineer these. Moreover, we write custom patches
that increase the RNG output to make measurements with
the Dieharder test suite feasible. These patches need to be
customized for each chip and the according operating systems,
which are Android, Linux, iOS, and macOS. Our main findings
are as follows:
• All chips (except the Samsung Galaxy S8 variants and an
iPhone) contain a HRNG. Yet, most implement a PRNG
fallback in case the HRNG is not available.
• The PRNG is based on various predictable inputs, which
significantly reduces its entropy. We show that an active
1Cypress acquired parts of Broadcom in 2016 [11], and the code bases
diverged since then.
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over-the-air attacker can infer and manipulate PRNG
values.
• Multiple patches were applied to the RNG implemen-
tation over time, such as adding a cache. The PRNG
fallback is no longer present in the most recent Broad-
com chips but Cypress still maintains this code.
• An HRNG is missing on the European version of the
Samsung Galaxy S8 and its variants in the S8+ and Note
8, which was sold approximately 40 million times.
• After responsibly disclosing the issue, the firmware was
patched in May 2020 in Samsung’s Android release as
well as in iOS 13.5 for an unspecified iPhone.
Flaws in the RNG allow attacks on Bluetooth authentica-
tion and encryption mechanisms. Recently, attacks on the
Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) key exchange and
key negotiation showed how sensitive these mechanisms
are [1, 2, 5, 17]. While these flaws were in the specifica-
tion itself, RNG issues are implementation-specific and rather
opaque.
We initiated responsible disclosure with Broadcom, Cy-
press, and a selection of their customers on January 12, 2020.
The weak PRNG implementation was assigned CVE-2020-
6616. Broadcom denied that the PRNG fallback was used on
any of their devices despite it being present in their firmware—
until we found and reported that the HRNG code and register
mappings were missing on the Samsung Galaxy S8 on Febru-
ary 1, 2020.
This paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we pro-
vide background information how the RNG is used within
security-critical parts of the Bluetooth specification. We
reverse-engineer 20 firmware variants in Section 3 and con-
tinue with HRNG and PRNG measurements as well as PRNG
attacks in Section 4. We discuss further aspects in Section 5.
We conclude our findings in Section 6.
2 RNG Usage Within Bluetooth
A predictable or known RNG has a severe impact on security-
relevant functions in Bluetooth. The Bluetooth 5.2 specifica-
tion only vaguely mentions that this is the case [7, p. 953],
but does not provide any context which functions break if
the RNG does not meet the requirements. Thus, we outline
concrete examples where the RNG matters. These examples
are not a complete list—this would exceed the scope of this
paper. In general, random numbers are used in many more
places within the Bluetooth specification, and an unknown
number of applications within host applications.
2.1 Active MITM Attack on Pairing with Nu-
meric Comparison
During the initial pairing of two Bluetooth devices, the proto-
col requires user input to prevent an active Machine-in-the-
Middle (MITM) attack, as no previous key material exists on
any of the devices to identify the other one. Bluetooth SSP
provides different methods for this kind of authentication,
a commonly used one is Numeric Comparison [7, p. 985]:
Both devices display a 6-digit number to the user and the
user checks whether both numbers are equal. While Numeric
Comparison was introduced for Classic Bluetooth with SSP,
it is also supported by BLE under the name LE Secure Con-
nections since Bluetooth 4.2 [7, p. 269], because the previous
LE Legacy Pairing is broken by design [16].
Numeric Comparison happens in the second stage of au-
thentication, after both parties have exchanged their ECDH
public keys. Device B, the non-initiating party, starts by gen-
erating a random number Nb and sending a commitment Cb
of Nb and both public keys to device A. Device A answers by
generating a random number, Na, as well, which it sends to
B. Finally, B sends Nb to A, A checks whether Cb is indeed
a commitment of Nb and both parties hash Na, Nb and both
public keys to a 6-digit number, which is then displayed on
both devices.
If there was an active MITM attacker, the public keys that
are fed into the hash function would differ and the two devices
would display different values with high probability. However,
this depends on the attacker not being able to change eitherNa
or Nb to search for a second pre-image of the hash function, as
the 6-digit output does not protect against brute-force attacks.
Therefore, the protocol is designed in a way that no party
can decide on their random number after seeing the random
number of the other party—A by sending its number first and
B by committing to its randomness before seeing Na.
The security of the Numeric Comparison protocol crucially
relies on the hiding property of the commitment, i.e., that
no party can calculate Nb from the commitment Cb. As the
commitment is deterministic, this requires Nb to be a number
with high entropy. Now, if an attacker can predict Nb or small
set of possible Nbs, they can check for Nb by calculating the
commitment again and comparing it to Cb. If successful, they
can use their knowledge of Nb to create a value Na′, sent to
B, such that both devices display the same 6-digit code even
though the public keys fed into the hash function differ. For
the full attack, see Figure 1.
2.2 LE Randomness Within Android
BLE uses the Security Manager Protocol (SMP) for pairing
in LE Secure Connections and LE Legacy Pairing [7, p. 1666].
SMP resides on top of Bluetooth Low Energy (LE) data Pro-
tocol Data Units (PDUs) and initiates secure keys. Encryption
is then started and stopped with LE link control PDUs inde-
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Device BDevice A MITM E
Select Na randomly
Set ra and rb to 0
Select Nb randomly
Set rb and ra to 0
Compute commitment:
Cb= f1(PKbx,PKex,Nb,0)
Guess Nb
Cb
Check if Cb== f1(PKbx,PKex,Nb,0)
Cb′ = f1(PKex,PKax,Nb,0)
Cb′
Na
Choose Na′ s.t. g(PKax,PKex,Na,Nb)
== g(PKex,PKbx,Na′,Nb) Na
′
Nb
Check if Cb′== f1(PKex,PKax,Nb,0)
Abort if check fails!
Va= g(PKax,PKex,Na,Nb) Vb= g(PKex,PKbx,Na′,Nb)
Va and Vb are 6-digit numbers displayed on both devices. The user
confirms with yes or no.
Just Works mode is the same as Numeric Comparison but without
displaying a number, thus, it does not have active MITM protection.
Figure 1: Numeric Comparison protocol attack vector [7, p. 986].
pendent from SMP.
When initiating a BLE pairing on Android 6–10, the
HCI command LE_Rand is called multiple times. This way,
Android receives specification-compliant random numbers
within its Bluetooth stack, but keeps control over the keys
itself. We further investigate the current Android master
branch as of April 2020 [3]. All randomness-related func-
tion calls originate from the file smp_keys.cc.
During a BLE pairing in Just Works mode, the func-
tions smp_create_private_key and smp_start_nonce_
generation are called. These use random inputs from the
Bluetooth chip’s RNG. smp_create_private_key directly
fills the ECDH private key by calling the Bluetooth RNG via
HCI four times in a row and then calculates a public key based
on this. Thus, an attacker who knows the internal RNG state
can infer the ECDH private key.
After creating the ECDH key pair, the value generated with
smp_start_nonce_generation is sent in plaintext over-the-
air and also contains RNG data. Then, an LE link control PDU
LL_ENC_REQ is sent [7, p. 2898], which also contains values
from the Bluetooth RNG, but is generated locally on the chip
without Android interaction.
This means that on Android, directly after using the Blue-
tooth RNG for creating a private key, further RNG values that
could leak the internal RNG state are sent in plaintext over-
the-air. Note that this behavior is not required by the Bluetooth
specification, e.g., iOS 13 does not call the Bluetooth RNG
upon SMP key generation.
3 Firmware Variant Analysis
In the following, we compare the RNG function across 20
firmware versions of even more devices. Sales numbers are
rather vague and older devices might no longer be in use,
but in total, the chips we analyzed are used in hundreds of
millions if not even in a billion of devices. An overview of
these is shown in Table 1. Since the firmware is located in
the ROM and built during device development, the firmware
build date is at least a year before the device release date. For
some MacBooks and the Raspberry Pi 4, it is even five years.
Moreover, some build dates do not represent the exact state
of the libraries that were compiled into it. Thus, the table is
sorted by firmware variants.
We obtain firmware dumps and locate the RNG function as
described in Section 3.1. Based on this analysis, we identify
five variants (see Section 3.2). We provide a pseudo-code
description of the main variants in Section 3.3.
3.1 Firmware Symbols and Comparison
Methods
InternalBlue enables firmware ROM and RAM dumps on
various operating systems to extract the firmware from Broad-
com and Cypress chips [13]. The extraction requires physical
device access and rooting or jailbreaking of mobile devices.
Moreover, such firmware dumps do not contain any symbols
or strings. Thus, reverse-engineering the RNG is not straight-
forward.
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Table 1: RNG implementation variants in 20 Broadcom and Cypress chips.
Variant Chip Device Build Date HRNG Location PRNG Cache
1 BCM2046A2 iMac Late 2009 2007 0xE9A00, 3 regs Minimal (inline) No
BCM2070B0 MacBook 2011 Jul 9 2008 0xE9A00, 3 regs
BCM20702A1 Asus USB Dongle, Thinkpad T420 Feb (?) 2010 0xEA204, 3 regs
2 BCM4335C0 Google Nexus 5 Dec 11 2012 0x314004, 3 regs Advanced (inline) No
BCM4345B0 iPhone 6 Jul 15 2013 0x314004, 3 regs
BCM20703A1 MacBook Pro early 2015 Dec 23 2013 0x314004, 3 regs
BCM43430A1 Raspberry Pi 3/Zero W Jun 2 2014 0x352600, 3 regs
BCM4345C0 Raspberry Pi 3+/4 Aug 19 2014 0x314004, 3 regs
BCM4358A3 Samsung Galaxy S6, Nexus 6P Oct 23 2014 0x314004, 3 regs
BCM4345C1 iPhone SE Jan 27 2015 0x314004, 3 regs
BCM4364B0 MacBook/iMac 2017–2019 Aug 21 2015 0x352600, 3 regs
BCM4355C0 iPhone 7 Sep 14 2015 0x352600, 3 regs
BCM20703A2 MacBook/iMac 2016–2017 Oct 22 2015 0x314004, 3 regs
CYW20719B1 Evaluation board Jan 17 2017 0x352600, 3 regs
3 CYW20735B1 Evaluation board Jan 18 2018 0x352600, 3 regs Advanced, 8 regs Yes, breaks after 32 elements
CYW20819A1 Evaluation board May 22 2018 0x352600, 3 regs Advanced, 5 regs Yes, with minor fixes
4 BCM4347B0 Samsung Galaxy S8/S8+/Note 8 Jun 3 2016 Not mapped Only option No
5 BCM4347B1 iPhone 8/X/XR Oct 11 2016 0x352600, 4 regs None Asynchronous 32x cache
BCM4375B1 Samsung Galaxy S10/S20 Apr 13 2018 0x352600, 4 regs
BCM4378B1 iPhone 11/SE2 Oct 25 2018 0x602600, 4 regs
The Cypress evaluation kits allow to develop an IoT ap-
plication with WICED Studio [10]. This application is run-
ning on the same ARM core as the Bluetooth firmware.
Thus, WICED Studio includes a file called patch.elf to
link the application during the build process. This patch
file contains global function and variable names. Further-
more, each board’s *map*.h file contains hardware register
names. WICED Studio also includes symbols in an Advanced
RISC Machine (ARM) compiler specific format for the Broad-
com BCM20703A2 Wi-Fi/Bluetooth combo chip in the files
ram_ext.symdefs and 20703mapa0.h.
We use these partial symbols for static firmware analysis
of the RNG, which is internally provided by the function
rbg_rand. Since the HRNG is only mapped to two differ-
ent locations throughout all variants, we can locate these in
further firmware variants. The oldest variant is mapped to
previously unknown addresses, but uses the same magic value
0x200FFFFF when accessing the HRNG.
3.2 Identified Variants
Table 1 compares the implementations of the function rbg_
rand. Regardless of the implementation variant, rbg_rand
always returns a 4 B random number. Overall, we identify five
different variants within firmware released over more than a
decade.
1. Minimal PRNG Fallback The oldest variant contains
the worst PRNG fallback. If no HRNG is available, it skips
waiting for a new random number and performs a static cal-
culation based on the current time—which might lead to zero
entropy.
2. Advanced PRNG Fallback This variant is similar to
variant (1) but the PRNG implementation is more advanced
and does not only consider time.
3. Cache and Advanced PRNG Fallback Cypress intro-
duced a cache that is constantly filled with 32 4 B random
numbers, probably to increase performance. Within this vari-
ant, also the registers used by the PRNG vary and some that
tend to be static were removed.
4. Advanced PRNG Only This variant is similar to variant
(2) but has the PRNG as only option. The HRNG access is
missing within the firmware and dynamic analysis reveals
that it is not mapped at all.
5. Asynchronous Cache and No PRNG The newest vari-
ant is a complete rewrite of the rbg library by Broadcom.
The cache is filled asynchronously in the background, the
HRNG has an additional register, and the PRNG fallback was
removed.
3.3 Implementation Details
Variant (2), the Advanced PRNG Fallback, is the most com-
mon variant that we found. Since we have partial symbols
for this variant, we can reconstruct the original logic of the
HRNG access (Listing 1) and PRNG implementation (List-
ing 2). Note that except from the complete rewrite in variant
(5), the code throughout all variants is very similar.
The HRNG is accessed with the three mapped registers
rbg_control, rbg_status, and rbg_random_num. A new
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random number is requested by writing 1 to rbg_control.
The rbg_status indicates if the HRNG is available in gen-
eral and if it currently has a fresh random number. The ran-
dom number itself is accessible via rbg_random_num. If the
HRNG is available in general, the rbg_rand function enters
an endless loop until a new random value is available. As this
loop might take longer, it pets the watchdog.
The PRNG depends on two timing values, which
are the Bluetooth clock dc_nbtc_clk and system clock
timer1value. The 4 B Bluetooth clock is comparably slow,
runs in steps of 312.5 µs [7, p. 415], and is shared over-the-
air. In comparison, the system clock passes faster and is not
1 uint32 rbg_rand(void){
2 uint32 RBG_CONST_READY = 0x200FFFFF;
3 uint32 RBG_CONST_STATUS_OK = 0xFFFFF000;
4 uint32 _rbg_ret_val;
5 uint32 *prng_store;
6
7 if (*rbg_status << 12 == RBG_CONST_STATUS_OK) {
8 while (*rbg_status != RBG_CONST_READY) {
9 wdog_restart();
10 *hrng_control = 1;
11 }
12 _rbg_ret_val = *rbg_random_num;
13 } else {
14 // rbg_get_psrng (inline)
15 }
16 *prng_store = _rbg_ret_val;
17 return (uint32) _rbg_ret_val;
18 }
Listing 1: Variant 1–4: rbg_rand on the BCM20703A2
MacBook.
init
get_rbg
teardown
1 bcs_waitForBTclock()
2 data_array[0] = *dc_nbtc_clk // Bluetooth clock
3 data_array[1] = *timer1value // System clock
4 data_array[2] = *dc_fhout
5 data_array[3] = *agcStatus
6 data_array[4] = *rxInitAngle
7 data_array[5] = *spurFreqErr1
8 data_array[6] = *rsPskPHErr5
9
10 if (*rgb_psrng_control == 0){
11 __rt_memcpy(data_array[7], mm_top , 4)
12 len = 0x2c
13 } else {
14 len = 0x20
15 data_array[7] = *psrng_store
16 }
17 _rbg_ret_val = crc32_update(0xFFFFFFFF , data_array , len)
18 bcs_releaseBTclock()
19 *rgb_psrng_control = 1
Listing 2: Variant 2–4: Advanced PRNG fallback on the
BCM20703A2 MacBook.
1 return clock ^ ((16 * static_register + 180) << 20) ^
static_value[4 * static_register]
Listing 3: Variant 1: Minimal PRNG fallback on the
BCM2046A2 iMac.
directly known. Depending on the platform, it is either 2 B
or 4 B. The remaining PRNG values are acquired from sig-
nal reception characteristics. If the PRNG was not used be-
fore, it is initialized based on the current memory contents.
Otherwise, the last value within the PRNG store is taken.
Since the rbg_rand function only returns 4 B, the entropy of
these values is combined by calculating a Cyclic Redundancy
Check (CRC).
The older variant (1), the Minimal PRNG Fallback, is even
worse. The fallback only performs a static calculation based
on the current time, as shown in Listing 3. The 4 B time
register is increased by one every 0.005 s.
4 HRNG and PRNG Tests
The function rbg_rand can be analyzed statically based on
firmware dumps, however, it must also be validated on physi-
cal hardware. For example, the code accessing the HRNG was
missing in the firmware of the Samsung Galaxy S8. However,
the code might be present and the test if the HRNG register is
available could still return false. Furthermore, if the PRNG
is accessed in absence of the HRNG, the entropy of the regis-
ters that it is accessing becomes relevant. In the following, we
first measure the HRNG in Section 4.1 and then measure the
PRNG fallback for the devices using it in Section 4.2. Addi-
tionally, we discuss specification-compliant attacks to change
PRNG inputs and infer the current PRNG state over-the-air
in Section 4.3.
4.1 HRNG Measurements
The only existing interface to acquire random numbers of the
Bluetooth chip is the Host Controller Interface (HCI) com-
mand LE_Rand [7, p. 2521]. After successful execution, this
command is answered with an HCI event containing an 8 B
random number. In theory, this could already be used on any
off-the-shelf device to measure the RNG quality. However,
Table 2: HRNG test results.
Chip Device Samples Test
BCM4335C0 Google Nexus 5 2.7 GB
BCM43430A1 Raspberry Pi 3/Zero W 1.3 GB Dieharder
BCM4345B0 iPhone 6 1.8 GB passed
BCM4355C0 iPhone 7 1.0 GB
BCM4345C0 Raspberry Pi 3+/4 1.4 GB
BCM4358A3 Samsung Galaxy S6, Nexus 6P 2.1 GB
CYW20719B1 Evaluation board 1.4 GB
CYW20735B1 Evaluation board 1.6 GB
CYW20819A1 Evaluation board 1.2 GB
BCM2046A2 iMac Late 2009 — X HRNG
BCM20703A1 MacBook Pro early 2015
BCM4375B1 Samsung Galaxy S10/S20
BCM4347B1 iPhone 8/X/XR
BCM4378B1 iPhone 11/SE2
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Figure 2: Hardware clock (timer1value) and Bluetooth clock (dc_nbtc_clk) on the Samsung Galaxy S8.
access via LE_Rand has two drawbacks. First, the Dieharder
test suite requires at least 1 GB of random data to success-
fully complete all tests. Second, further functions within the
Bluetooth firmware might access the RNG in parallel and
influence the results.
Utilizing InternalBlue [13], we make the following modifi-
cations to Broadcom and Cypress chips to collect HRNG data.
We substitute the original rbg_rand routine with return 0
to gain exclusive HRNG access. Except from the evaluation
boards, all chips are Wi-Fi/Bluetooth combo chips. Thus, we
also disable Wi-Fi to exclude further side-effects. Then, we
collect random data in chunks. The chunk size depends on the
memory available on the specific device, but on most devices,
we found free chunks of 20.480 kB. This allows to collect
4096 measurements of 5 B values. After each 4 B returned by
the HRNG, we insert one static check byte, which we remove
before running Dieharder. This ensures that no other process
was using this memory area in parallel and is faster to insert
than a checksum. Once collection of a chunk is finished, we
issue an asynchronous HCI event to notify the host. Then,
the host collects the random data using the vendor-specific
command Read_RAM, which can read 251 B chunks.
The Dieharder test suite usually expects an endless source
of randomness, such as /dev/urandom on UNIX-like oper-
ating systems. In contrast, the Bluetooth HRNG results are
stored in files. As a baseline, we run Dieharder on files pro-
duced with /dev/urandom as input and find that at least 1 GB
of random data is required to pass all tests. Therefore, this is
the lower bound of data collected for each chip. With the mod-
ifications listed above, data collection takes approximately
one day, depending on the chip’s interface and operating sys-
tem. Table 2 shows how much data was collected per chip
and that the HRNGs in all chips passed the Dieharder tests.
Each data extraction for the Dieharder test suite still takes
comparably long and requires custom patches. However,
given that the extensively tested HRNGs passed all tests, al-
ready checking if a HRNG is present on a chip is an important
information. InternalBlue implements everything required for
such a basic check out-of-the-box—reading chip memory and
sending HCI commands. The hardware registers listed in Ta-
ble 1 must contain one 4 B random number. This number is
indeed the one used by the rbg_rand function if it changes
with actions like pairing. On devices supporting BLE, the
HRNG can be triggered with the HCI command LE_Rand.
Firmware versions implementing a cache are required to get
a call to LE_Rand multiple times before the HRNG is used.
The second half of Table 2 contains devices from which
we could not collect samples but that indeed have an HRNG.
These devices include the iMac Late 2009, the newest Sam-
sung Galaxy S series, and the iPhone 11 and SE2. On the
iMac Late 2009, we were not able to program custom patches
because RAM is very limited on that chip. Moreover, its in-
terface is slow 2, making it unrealistic to extract 1 GB of data.
The Samsung Galaxy S10 and S20 series use the same chip.
However, Broadcom improved firmware security and added
stack canaries, which prevent calling functions out of context
without additional modifications within our patches. As of
now, there is no InternalBlue support for Peripheral Compo-
nent Interconnect Express (PCIe) Bluetooth chips as on the
most recent iPhone 11 and SE2. Nonetheless, the chip can be
tested with BlueTool on jailbroken iPhones. BlueTool is an
Apple-internal tool included on iOS. It is utilized for driver
initialization, but it also has a rudimentary command-line
interface with HCI support.
4.2 PRNG Measurements
The Samsung Galaxy S8 series and an iPhone are missing
an HRNG. As there is a PRNG fallback, the firmware is still
able to generate somewhat random numbers instead of being
obviously broken for an outsider without firmware knowledge.
Most likely the RNG test required to pass the specification did
not include a firmware review, and, thus, only the checksumed
2One specification-compliant HCI randomness event contains 8 B, while
our events fill the maximum possible event payload of 251 B. The timing
of HCI events is almost constant independent on their size. Assuming that
our 251 B data extraction runs one day, the 8 B data extraction would require
a month per device. The exact HCI speed depends on the InternalBlue and
host-specific implementation of each device.
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combination of the registers the PRNG uses was measured.
The PRNG is accessing multiple hardware registers, listed
in Table 3. While we do not have any symbols for the Sam-
sung Galaxy S8 firmware, it is using the same registers as
the BC20703A2 MacBook chip, and also the same code as
previously shown in Listing 2.
We measure the PRNG registers with similar firmware
modifications as for the HRNG measurements and also dis-
able Wi-Fi. Over 1000 rounds, we store 4096 4 B values to
the chip’s internal RAM. Then, we collect them via HCI. Due
to the current InternalBlue implementation on Android 9, HCI
introduces a delay, which is 3.075 s on average in our mea-
surements. Thus, data about each register is collected over a
time span of approximately 51 min. Each measurement round
Table 3: PRNG inputs on the Samsung Galaxy S8.
Address Register Entropy
— Rand Previous 4 B random value (leaks over-the-air)
0x318088 dc_nbtc_clk Bluetooth clock, publicly available over-the-air
0x32A004 timer1value Hardware clock, 4 B “random” before first leak,
unpatched attacks for clock reset available
0x3186A0 dc_fhout Changes a bit (0x02–0x50)
0x410434 agcStatus Changes a bit (0xc00 during whole measure-
ment, slight changes within 0xcnn after reboot)
0x41079C rxInitAngle Changes a bit but within similar range
0x4100AC spurFreqErr1 Constant 2 B value (0x04ed, also after reboot)
0x410548 rxPskPhErr5 Always 0
2 10 18 26 34 42 50 58 66 74
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
·104
Figure 3: Histogram of values of dc_fhout observed on a
Samsung Galaxy S8.
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Figure 4: dc_fhout over time on the Samsung Galaxy S8.
takes roughly 2.58 ms on the chip itself.
During the whole experiment, spurFreqErr1 and
rxPskPhErr5 stayed constant. The only non-clock hard-
ware registers that changed are dc_fhout, rxInitAngle, and
agcStatus. As shown in the histograms (Figure 3–6), these
registers have very little variation. Moreover, they typically
stay constant within one round and often even constant over
multiple rounds. Figure 4 shows dc_fhout over time. In addi-
tion to the comparably slow change in its value, it also shows
a pattern.
The clock registers dc_nbtc_clk and timer1value
change, but they are also not random. The Bluetooth clock,
dc_nbtc_clk, is shared over-the-air. This is required to keep
connections synchronous. In addition, the current Bluetooth
clock value is used in substantial parts of the protocol, i.e., as
encryption algorithm input. As shown in Figure 2, the hard-
ware and Bluetooth clock are aligned. However, the hardware
clock has a 205 times higher granularity than the Bluetooth
clock, meaning that even for a known Bluetooth clock and a
hardware clock value that leaked once, future hardware clock
values still have a slight variance.
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a Samsung Galaxy S8.
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4.3 PRNG Attacks
All variants, including the newest variant 5, access the rbg_
rand function in the same way. An overview of the calling
structure is shown in Figure 7. How rbg_rand is used be-
comes relevant when attacking the PRNG. Attacks on the
PRNG can be divided into predicting (Section 4.3.1) and in-
fluencing (Section 4.3.2) its inputs as well as extracting its
current state (Section 4.3.3). Combining all of these provides
the strongest attack vector. However, an attacker can opt to
not actively manipulate the PRNG inputs, resulting in more
bits to brute-force within random numbers or to infer the
precise internal PRNG state. We describe how an attacker
can predict PRNG outputs due to its weak implementation in
Section 4.3.4.
4.3.1 Predicting PRNG Inputs
While some functions access rbg_rand directly, others use
the wrapper sha_get_128b_rand that returns a 16 B random
number. This wrapper calls rbg_rand 16 times in a row and
applies the SHA-1 function. Note that SHA-1 is outdated
and the Bluetooth specification recommends using SHA-256
within RNGs [7, p. 953]. Since the timing of subsequent
calls in a loop is predictable, PRNG inputs that depend on
time do not provide any additional entropy in this context.
Moreover, dc_fhout, rxInitAngle, and agcStatus stayed
constant within one measurement round in most cases, and,
thus, also do not add any entropy except from the value in the
first round.
4.3.2 Influencing PRNG Inputs
An attacker who has a crash-only over-the-air attack can re-
set the hardware clock to 0xFFFFFFFF. Since the Patchram
slots in the Broadcom and Cypress chips are rare, only severe
security issues can be patched. Crash-only attacks, such as
CVE-2019-6994, often remain unpatched [9]. The Bluetooth
and hardware clock stay correlated over time, meaning that an
attacker does not necessarily need to crash the chip while the
user is pairing a new device or initiating an encrypted session,
but any time before.
In addition to control and knowledge about the clock, a
timed crash and following packet calling the PRNG might
also set the current PRNG status to a less random value. The
very first PRNG round is initialized by copying memory from
RAM (see line 11 in Listing 2), which this is likely filled with
predictable contents during chip initialization.
4.3.3 Extracting PRNG Outputs
An attacker needs to know the current PRNG state including
the previous random value Rand to get full knowledge about
future PRNG values. Assuming that the firmware already
accesses the PRNG a few times during initialization, even
a chip reset might leave the attacker with some variability.
Moreover, an attacker might not be able to reset the chip and,
thus, does not have any knowledge about the internal PRNG
state and needs to brute-force it.
All BLE-related functions access ulp_rand, which in turn
calls rbg_rand. Thus, the LE_Rand HCI command allows
direct access to the current RNG state.
However, an attacker typically acts over-the-air and does
not have access to the host. The current state of the RNG can
be leaked over-the-air as follows. An attacker can send an
LL_ENC_REQ [7, p. 2898], which is answered with an LL_ENC_
RSP [7, p. 2899]. The LL_ENC_RSP by the device under attack
contains the fields SKDs and IVs. Within the firmware, these
are generated by the functions smulp_genSKD and smulp_
genIV, which both call ulp_rand that directly accesses the
PRNG. This implementation is the same for the CYW20735B1
evaluation board, which is shown in the call graph in Figure 7,
and the Samsung Galaxy S8.
Regarding the Samsung Galaxy S8, the Android imple-
mentation mentioned in Section 2.2 is vulnerable to passive
MITM attacks. An attacker does not need to establish a con-
nection and send an LL_ENC_REQ PDU—Android transmits
the BLE RNG state within various packet types.
An attacker who inferred the current PRNG state and has
knowledge or control about the hardware clock can calculate
upcoming values provided by the PRNG.
4.3.4 Predicting PRNG Outputs
We will now describe how to predict randomness generated
by the PRNG based on previous outputs. For each 4 B ran-
...
sp_generate_PPKeyPair
...
smulp_genIV
...
lm_HandleHCIMasterLinkKey
ap_action_txStartEncryptReq
_ape_action_txCombKey
ape_rand
ulp_rand
sha_get_128b_rand
lculp_createAccessAddress
lculp_initSetConnDefaultParam
...
rbg_rand
Figure 7: Call graph to rbg_rand on the CYW20735B1 eval-
uation board.
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domness, the PRNG uses the previous output concatenated
with the internal clock, the Bluetooth clock, and a number of
registers. Then, it hashes them using a Cyclic Redundancy
Check (CRC). Note that the input state consists of 32 B, there-
fore, it is infeasible to determine the full state based on outputs
of the PRNG, even if we know that some of the values are not
uniformly random. However, an attacker can exploit the fact
that CRC32 is an affine function, using an initialization value
of IV =0xFFFFFFFF. For two inputs a and b,
CRC32(a)⊕CRC32(b) = CRC32(a⊕b)⊕CRC32(IV ).
Due to this affinity of CRC32, if we know the two previous
outputs of the PRNG, we only need to guess the difference in
the inputs to the PRNG. For the Bluetooth clock, we know its
value as it is included in every transmission, and for the system
clock, only the lowest bits will change with high probability.
Further, as shown in the previous sections, the entropy in
the other registers is quite low. Let out0 and out1 be the two
previous outputs, then
out2 = out1⊕CRC32(C||R||P)⊕CRC32(IV ),
where C is the guessed bit difference in both clocks, R is the
guessed bit difference in the registers, and P, the bit difference
to the previous output field, is given by
P= CRC32(out0)⊕CRC32(out1)⊕CRC32(IV ).
We estimate the difference entropy of the registers to be less
than 18 bit. If we assume we have a synchronization between
the Bluetooth clock and the hardware clock as described in
Section 4.3.2, we need 8 bit for the hardware clock, result-
ing in a total of 26 bit. Note that further calls to the PRNG
afterward are deterministic with high probability.
For example, for Numeric Comparison, we start by choos-
ing a 128 bit random number Nb, which is generated by 16
successive calls to the PRNG. As we have shown in Sec-
tion 2.1, the knowledge of Nb would enable an MITM attack
on the pairing process. Further, due to the deterministic com-
mitment, we can check as an MITM attacker whether we
found the correct Nb. A brute force attack to check all possi-
ble outputs of the PRNG would take about 5 min on a single
CPU core. As this is trivially parallelizable, this is a realistic
attack given enough computing power. Similar efficiency is
to be expected in the case of generated private keys using
randomness from the PRNG, as discussed in Section 2.2.
5 Discussion
Initially, we only measured the PRNG fallback on the Cy-
press evaluation boards and the Google Nexus 5. However,
we found that the PRNG was not accessed during regular
usage on those devices. Nonetheless, we suspected it being
used in other chips due to the observed code changes, and,
thus, reported it to Broadcom, Cypress, Apple, Google, and
Samsung on January 12, 2020. We also informed the main-
tainer of BTstack [6] on the same date, because we observed
that they were excessively using the HCI LE_Rand function
during initialization of the Bluetooth stack for key generation.
After a discussion with the BTstack maintainer, we decided
to test if the PRNG was accessed on the Raspberry Pi 3/3+
when constantly calling LE_Rand for more than a day, but
luckily, the results were negative.
After this first round of responsible disclosure, Broadcom
claimed that the PRNG fallback would not be used on any of
their devices. This is when we started analyzing 20 different
firmware versions. We informed Broadcom, Samsung, and
Google about the missing HRNG in the Samsung Galaxy S8
on February 1, and also updated the others about the possibil-
ity that there are indeed chips without HRNG. Google closed
the issue as Won’t Fix (Infeasible) on February 4, because it is
up to Broadcom to fix the firmware and none of their products
is affected. A patch for the Samsung Galaxy S8 as well as its
variants S8+ and Note 8 was released in May.
There are a few iPhone models that we did not test, and the
iOS 13.5 release contains a patch for a model that also missed
a proper RNG. Since a test requires a jailbroken iPhone and
we do not have all iPhone models available for testing, we
could not identify the precise model and also could not per-
form any measurements. However, we performed tests for
the registers used by the fallback on other devices and they
provide similar properties as those on the Samsung Galaxy
S8.
As Samsung is using Broadcom as well as Qualcomm chips
on their smartphones, depending on the market and device
model, they asked if they could forward our report. Since
we did not find anything on Qualcomm chips ourselves and
Qualcomm has an Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) with
Samsung possibly allowing them to include confidential infor-
mation, we asked Samsung to forward the report and exclude
us if needed. We received the following answer on March 3:
“We haven’t found any indicators that our Blue-
tooth implementations are affected by the PRNG
issue after internally discussing the research results
that were shared with us.”
QPSIIR-1329
What remains unclear is how the Samsung Galaxy S8 hap-
pened to miss an HRNG in the first place. The code for access-
ing the HRNG is already missing in the firmware, indicating
that this issue was most likely known to developers during
compilation—if not optimized and automated by another pro-
cess. Yet, the BCM4347B0 chip made it into such a popular
smartphone.
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6 Conclusion
The development over a decade within the Broadcom and
Cypress chips indicates that the RNG is indeed a central com-
ponent. The firmware history shows how the PRNG fallback
was first improved and then removed completely. However,
removing it might also be harmful. If the PRNG fallback had
been missing in the Samsung Galaxy S8, it might have simply
returned static values.
Another interesting detail in the firmware history is that Cy-
press independently developed the PRNG code after acquiring
the IoT branch of Broadcom in 2016 [11]. This indicates that
also the patching process might differ depending on which
company is assigned to which chip, even though the firmware
has similar issues.
Overall, the RNG provided by a Bluetooth chip remains a
black box without intensive analysis. The Bluetooth specifica-
tion requires an RNG that passes tests such as the Dieharder
test suite. This requirement leads to the potentially false as-
sumption that a Bluetooth chip’s RNG can be trusted for
security-relevant operations, including the HCI LE_Rand com-
mand exposing the RNG to energy-constrained embedded
devices and the Android Bluetooth stack. Our RNG testing
scripts are publicly available, allowing benchmarks of future
or not yet tested Broadcom and Cypress chips as well as port-
ing these concepts to chips of other manufacturers.
We tested many Bluetooth chips on our own. However,
it would be helpful if manufacturers made details about the
RNG openly accessible. During our research, we only found
that the non-Bluetooth Broadcom main System on Chip (SoC)
on the Raspberry Pi might include an HRNG that is based
on thermal noise [12]. More transparency, i.e., statements
whether a chip includes an HRNG or a PRNG and which type
exactly, would be helpful when making design decisions on
embedded and mobile devices.
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